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‘A beautiful prospect delights the soul, as much as a demonstration…’
The Spectator, No. 411
1. Introduction1
‘Those who tread the enchanted ground of  Poetry, oftentimes do not even 
suspect that there is such a thing as Method to guide their steps’ – Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge remarked in 1818.2 Imagery of  enchanted grounds may 
be traced back through a long literary tradition, including Spenser’s Bower 
of  Bliss, or Shakespeare’s several forests and magical island. Ideas of  quest 
and romance associated with all these lend a somewhat fantastical colouring 
to Coleridge’s emphasis on method. Method, like Prospero’s magic, guides 
the reader through the pleasures of  poetry, while the text itself  is fi gured as 
enchanted ground. But Coleridge’s overall argument is far less poetical, or only 
in the sense in which, as he wrote earlier in the Biographia Literaria of  1817, 
‘Poetry . . . had a logic of  its own, as severe as that of  science’.3 His point about 
poetic method appears in a work entitled General Introduction; or, Preliminary 
Treatise on Method, a lengthy and rigorously argued text that sets out to formu-
late the essence and importance of  method not only in the fi ne arts but more 
generally, in all branches of  intellectual activity including philosophy and the 
experimental sciences. The Treatise is one of  Coleridge’s less frequently stud-
ied pieces, although I. A. Richards called attention to it already in 1936 in The 
Philosophy of  Rhetoric, remarking that it has ‘more bearing on a possible future 
 1 This paper was supported by the Bolyai János Research Scholarship of  the Hungarian 
Academy of  Sciences.
 2 Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s Treatise on Method as published in the Encyclopaedia 
Metropolitana, ed. Alice D. Snyder, (London, 1934), 25. Subsequent references to this 
edition appear in the main text as (TM).
 3 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria or Biographical Sketches of  my Literary Life 
and Opinions, eds. James Engell and W. Jackson Bate (Princeton, 1983, 2 vols), I, 9. 




for Rhetoric than anything I know of  in the offi cial literature’.4 If  scholarship 
has been reluctant to engage with the text, it is probably due to its complicated 
publishing history: there is no authorized version available, only the printed 
one heavily edited by Coleridge’s publishers.5 However, if  we accept the fact 
of  limited authorial control, we might as well take into account the context 
in which it fi rst appeared: an emerging fi eld of  scientifi c discourse in which 
disciplines like the newly scientifi c ‘criticism’ were carving out a space for 
themselves.   
The Treatise was originally written as an introduction to a new publishing 
venture the Encyclopaedia Metropolitana, and was printed in its fi rst volume in 
January 1818. The project, in which Coleridge participated fi rst enthusiasti-
cally and later with regret, was meant to revise the encyclopaedic tradition 
and, specifi cally, two of  its key representatives. The primary target was the 
Great Encyclopaedia of  Diderot and d’Alembert (1751–66), which was being 
re-structured as Encyclopédie Méthodique and in the process of  publication at the 
time (TM, vii).6 Less conspicuously, the Metropolitana was also aimed to rival 
the infl uential Encyclopaedia Britannica, which, by 1797, had already reached its 
third edition. 
The Britannica itself  was advertised by its Edinburgh publishers as being 
arranged ‘on a new plan’. Instead of  ‘dismembering the Sciences’ through 
the alphabetical defi nition of  terms, its authors expounded ‘the principles of  
every science in the form of  systems or distinct treatises’; that is, the Britannica 
included lengthy and structured articles on the sciences and the practical arts, 
such as medicine, metallurgy, or metaphysics, themselves arranged alpha-
betically.7 The discussions were based on both established and more recent 
sources, as well as on new research, thus making available to the general 
British reading public important segments of  the scientifi c and philosophical 
achievements of  the Scottish Enlightenment. The distinguishing feature of  
the Metropolitana, in turn, was to be its innovative ‘method’: it was arranged 
in an entirely thematic, not alphabetical, order. When Coleridge rewrote his 
 4 I. A. Richards, The Philosophy of  Rhetoric (1936; New York, 1965), 6.
 5 The publication history of  the Treatise and its rewriting for The Friend of  1818 is 
explained in Samuel Taylor Coleridge, The Friend, ed. Barbara E. Rooke (Princeton, 
1969, 2 vols), I, lxxxiii–iv.
 6 On the Méthodique, begun in 1789 but completed only in 1832, see Robert Darnton, 
The Business of  Enlightenment: A publishing history of  the Encyclopédie 1775–1800 
(Cambridge, MA, London, 1979).
 7 William Smellie (ed.), Encyclopaedia Britannica; or, A Dictionary of  Arts and Sciences, 
Compiled upon a New Plan (Edinburgh, 1768–1771; 1st edn; 3 vols), I, v.
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Treatise as a series of  essays for The Friend later in 1818, he still emphasised that 
‘the alphabetical arrangement of  a common dictionary’ should not be called 
‘methodical’.8 Carefully planned and proportioned in advance, the discussion 
of  different areas of  knowledge in the Metropolitana was intended to move 
systematically from the abstract and general (the ‘pure sciences’ such as geom-
etry) to the more empirical (the ‘mixed’ and ‘applied sciences’). As Richard 
Yeo observes, this unique design refl ected the editors’ intention to counter 
the disintegration of  knowledge that resulted from increased specialization in 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, although, arguably, it also 
contributed to the crystallization of  disciplines at the same time. In any case, 
Yeo calls the Metropolitana ‘the last signifi cant attempt at a philosophical order-
ing of  subjects’ in the encyclopaedic tradition.9
It was the task of  Coleridge’s general introduction to establish the princi-
ples justifying such an arrangement, and he deduces them from the idea of  
method. Method, according to the Treatise, ‘literally means a way, or path, of  
transit. Hence the fi rst idea of  Method is a progressive transition from one step 
in any course to another’ (TM, 2). What Coleridge fi nds important in this 
etymology is not that method makes intellectual journeying more effi cient 
(something that many earlier authors had emphasised) but that its movement 
involves a primary mental orientation or ‘pre-conception’: 
[W]here the word Method is applied with reference to many such tran-
sitions in a continuity, it necessarily implies a Principle of  Unity with 
Progression. But that which unites, and makes many things one in the 
Mind of  Man, must be an act of  the Mind itself, a manifestation of  
intellect, and not a spontaneous and uncertain production of  circum-
stances. (TM, 2) 
 8 Coleridge, The Friend, I, 457. It may be noted that Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary was 
considered ‘methodical’ precisely because of  its alphabetical arrangement. See Robin 
Valenza, ‘How Literature Becomes Knowledge: A Case Study,’ ELH 76 (2009), 215–
45.
 9 Richard Yeo, ‘Reading Encyclopedias: Science and the Organization of  Knowledge 
in British Dictionaries of  Arts and Sciences, 1730-1850,’ Isis 82 (1991), 24–49, 
25–6. For a different discussion of  Coleridge’s Treatise and scientifi c specialization 
in the nineteenth century see James Brooke-Smith, ‘“A great empire falling to 
pieces”: Coleridge, Herschel, and Whewell on the Poetics of  Unitary Knowledge’, 
Confi gurations 20 (2012), 299–325. 
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Coleridge therefore argues that philosophical or scientifi c investigation cannot 
begin with the gathering of  data; in this sense, it can never be a purely inductive 
process. A methodical inquiry must start with a question, an idea, or mental 
‘initiative’, even if  this does not guarantee that the inquirer will safely arrive at 
an answer. Coleridge also admits that an exuberant mind may be led ‘to gener-
alize and methodize to excess’, and concludes that method, according to its 
most comprehensive defi nition, ‘must result from the due mean, or balance, 
between our passive impressions and the mind’s re-action on them’ (TM, 5). 
According to Alice D. Snyder, Coleridge’s models included Schelling’s 
Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums of  1803 and Carl C. E. 
Schmid’s Allgemeine Encyklopädie und Methodologie der Wissenschaften of  1810 (TM, 
xxii). Since her 1934 edition, considerable attention has been paid to the infl u-
ence of  German idealism on Coleridge’s thinking, especially that of  Schelling, 
who inspired the tripartite structure envisioned for the Metropolitana.10 
However, in order to complement such inquiries and to complicate still 
standard assumptions about Romanticism’s ‘transcendence’ of  earlier British 
thought with the help of  German Idealism,11 this paper focuses on a line 
of  thinking in eighteenth-century English and Scottish aesthetics to which 
Coleridge also responded, one that used the concept of  method to account 
for ‘enchantment’ in poetry, fi gured alternately as a garden or a forest, wild or 
well-cared-for. Based on the careful reading of  a number of  examples from 
this tradition, the present paper investigates how descriptions of  the aesthetic 
experience in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century made use of  the 
concept of  method, together with its disparate contexts in rhetorical, logical 
and scientifi c discourse.
2. Johnson’s Forest
Coleridge illustrates ‘the strictest Philosophical application’ of  the principle of  
method in the fi ne arts through ‘one single evidence’: Shakespeare, to whom 
he devotes several pages of  his preliminary Treatise. Clearly, this is meant as a 
provocation, as British readers, for a long time, ‘had been taught to consider 
10 Most recently, see Paul Hamilton, Coleridge and German Philosophy: The Poet in the Land 
of  Logic (London and New York, 2007). A reliable earlier discussion can be found in 
J. R. de J. Jackson, Method and Imagination in Coleridge’s Criticism (Cambridge, MA, 1969). 
11 Cairns Craig challenged this way of  thinking in ‘Coleridge, Hume, and the Chains 
of  the Romantic Imagination’ in Leith Davis, Ian Duncan and Janet Sorensen (eds.), 
Scotland and the Borders of  Romanticism (Cambridge, 2004), 20–37, 23.
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[Shakespeare’s works] as eminently immethodical’ (TM, 16; emphasis in the orig-
inal). Coleridge points to ‘schools of  foreign taste’ as responsible for such 
a view, later bringing up Voltaire by name, but the critic who looms large 
in this context is the English Samuel Johnson, one of  Coleridge’s foremost 
adversaries – and sometimes covert inspirations – in literary criticism. Up to 
Coleridge’s day, Johnson’s Preface of  1765 to his edition of  Shakespeare set 
the tone and the key terms of  discussion. It was reprinted in several publica-
tions (e.g. the Variorum editions of  Shakespeare used by Coleridge for his 
literary lectures) and excerpted for the Shakespeare entry of  the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica of  1797, among others. In a magisterial sentence, Johnson sums up 
his overall sense of  Shakespeare’s artistry as follows:
The work of  a correct and regular writer is a garden accurately formed 
and diligently planted, varied with shades, and scented with fl owers; 
the composition of  Shakespeare is a forest, in which oaks extend their 
branches, and pines tower in the air, interspersed sometimes with weeds 
and brambles, and sometimes giving shelter to myrtles and to roses; 
fi lling the eye with awful pomp, and gratifying the mind with endless 
diversity.12
The work of  art as garden offers all the variegated pleasures that result from 
good design and diligent ‘culture’; it is evidently the product of  conscious 
effort on the part of  its author(s) and should be appreciated as such. The work 
of  art as forest is felt, baffl ingly, as if  it had no design at all, either in the sense 
of  a well-laid-out plan, or in that of  having a design on the reader: it seems 
to exist in absolute disregard of  a potential audience. But for Johnson, this is 
exactly what makes the experience of  reading Shakespeare so overwhelming. 
Verbs like ‘extend’ and ‘tower’ express the sense of  sublimity or ‘awful pomp’ 
that is contrasted, along Longinian lines, with the calculated effects of  correct 
works that even Voltaire could admire, such as Joseph Addison’s Cato (the 
subject of  Johnson’s previous paragraph).13 These verbs may also be linked to 
12 Johnson on Shakespeare, ed. Arthur Sherbo (New Haven and London, 1968, 2 vols), I, 
84.
13 Johnson’s Life of  Addison suggests that what was missing from Cato was precisely 
the enchanting power that Shakespeare’s plays possessed: ‘Nothing here “excites or 
asswages emotion”; here is “no magical power of  raising phantastick terror or wild 
anxiety”. The events are expected without solicitude, and are remembered without 
joy or sorrow.’ Samuel Johnson, The Lives of  the Poets, ed. John H. Middendorf  
(New Haven and London, 2010; 3 vols), II, 656..
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Alexander Pope’s earlier comparison between Shakespeare and Gothic archi-
tecture, which concluded his Preface of  1725.14 But Johnson translates Pope’s 
history-laden image to a description of  natural scenery, making Shakespeare’s 
work transcend human time, albeit with its own characteristic mixed tempo-
rality spanning the longue durée of  grand oaks and pines and the ephemeral 
existence of  weeds. 
‘Weeds and brambles’ indicate Johnson’s frustration over Shakespeare’s 
carelessness: his tendency to waste his powers on what the critic regarded 
as unworthy pursuits. According to Sean Keilen, ‘the wildness of  the natu-
ral world serves Johnson as a metaphor for the “barbarity” of  Shakespeare’s 
period, the unruliness of  the English language at that time and the “extrava-
gance” of  the poetic licence that Shakespeare took’.15 But of  course it also 
conveys Johnson’s admiration for his profuse creativity. ‘Myrtles and roses’ are 
conventional metaphors for local beauties that might be discovered by atten-
tive readers and collected in anthologies or fl orilegia. The imagery, on the whole, 
evokes the concept of  the Latin silva, meaning ‘woods, brush, forest’, but, as 
Walter J. Ong explains, also ‘meaning an abundance or congeries or quan-
tity, as in Cicero, Suetonius, and Quintilian’.16 Ong shows that Renaissance 
rhetoricians often relied on this notion, as well as on the related Greek ΰλη, 
and tended ‘to think of  the “matter” of  discourse in terms of  woods to be 
dealt with by a process of  “sorting out” or “cutting out” or “arranging”’.17 
Thus, Ben Jonson entitled his verse miscellanies The Forest and Under-woods, 
and his commonplace-book Timber, or Discoveries upon Men and Matter as They 
Have Flowed Out of  His Daily Readings. Shakespeare’s works had been them-
selves subjected to ‘commonplacing’ long before Johnson’s time: readers had 
started to gather passages to be re-used in their own writing or conversation 
almost from the moment of  their fi rst production.18 Later, printed collections 
of  his ‘beauties’ (most infl uentially, William Dodd’s The Beauties of  Shakespeare, 
fi rst published in 1752) became commercially successful. However, what all 
14 See Brian Vickers (ed.), William Shakespeare: The Critical Heritage, Volume 2, 1693–1733 
(London and New York, 1974), 303.
15 Sean Keilen, Vulgar Eloquence: On the Renaissance Invention of  English Literature (New 
Haven and London, 2006), 124.
16 Walter J. Ong, S.J., Ramus, Method, and the Decay of  Dialogue: From the Art of  Discourse to 
the Art of  Reason (1958; Cambridge, MA and London, 1983), 118.
17 Ibid., 119.
18 See e.g. Margreta de Grazia, ‘Shakespeare in Quotation Marks’ in Jean I. Marsden 
(ed.), The Appropriation of  Shakespeare: Post-Renaissance Reconstructions of  the Works and the 
Myth (New York, 1991), 57–71.
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the abundance of  Shakespeare’s works could not yield, according to Johnson, 
was their own plan: they just happened to be the way they were, without any 
perceivable order, leaving literary travellers to their own devices to fi nd their 
way into, or out of, the wilderness.
3. Addison’s Garden
While Johnson’s passage is essentially static, suggesting a place that the reader 
might not even want to leave, Addison’s earlier and closely related discus-
sions are all about movement. The connection is somewhat ironic, since 
Johnson had already referred to Addison to compare his play, tactfully but 
ultimately unfavourably, to those of  Shakespeare, but the very comparison 
of  the regular garden and the Shakespearean forest is arguably based on the 
same author. As it has been amply documented, Addison’s meditations in The 
Pleasures of  the Imagination series had a formative infl uence on both the theory 
and the practice of  eighteenth-century gardening and especially the landscape 
garden.19 Johnson was probably aware of  this, when he implicitly described 
Addison’s own kind of  regular drama as analogous to an ‘accurately formed 
and diligently planted’ garden, ‘varied with shades, and scented with fl owers’. 
Compared to the magnifi cence of  Shakespeare’s forest, this is all meant to 
sound a bit underwhelming. 
However, a glance at The Spectator papers shows that Addison himself  
had developed a far more generous stance towards gardening, one that could 
welcome forms of  disorderly nature, including marshes and forests. As he 
points out in The Spectator No. 414, the very countryside may be turned, with 
slight improvements, into a work of  art (a ‘landscape’, as in painting), if  the 
beholder-proprietor wishes so:
A Marsh over-grown with Willows, or a Mountain shaded with Oaks, 
are not only more beautiful, but more benefi cial, than when they lie 
bare and unadorned. Fields of  Corn make a pleasant Prospect, and if  
the Walks were a little taken care of  that lie between them, if  the natural 
Embroidery of  the Meadows were helpt and improved by some small 
Additions of  Art, and the several Rows of  Hedges set off  by Trees and 
19 See e.g. Mavis Batey, ‘The Pleasures of  the Imagination: Joseph Addison’s Infl uence 
on Early Landscape Gardens’, Garden History 33 (2005), 189–209.
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Flowers, that the Soil was capable of  receiving, a Man might make a 
pretty Landskip of  his own Possessions.20    
The secret lies in discovering art in nature, and then enhancing it a little further, 
for instance by adding a conscious frame or border to the natural ‘embroidery’ 
of  fi elds through well-cared-for walks or rows of  hedges. One might speculate 
about the importance of  such features to Addison’s overall scheme; argua-
bly, walking paths lend structure to beautiful prospects when seen from afar, 
but even more crucially, they determine both the changing perspective and 
the rhythm of  experience enjoyed by the appreciative walker. According to 
Stephanie Ross, a path receding into the distance is ‘the quintessential example 
of  an “invitational” landscape feature’ in Addison’s writings.21
Movement plays an important role also when Addison discusses literature 
in terms of  landscape, as when he compares three classical authors in The 
Pleasures of  the Imagination (Spectator No. 417):
Reading the Iliad is like travelling through a Country uninhabited, 
where the Fancy is entertained with a thousand Savage Prospects of  
vast Desarts, wide uncultivated Marshes, huge Forests, mis-shapen 
Rocks and Precipices. On the contrary, the Aeneid is like a well-ordered 
Garden, where it is impossible to fi nd out any Part unadorned, or cast 
our Eyes upon a single Spot, that does not produce some beautiful 
Plant or Flower. But when we are in the Metamorphosis, we are walking 
on enchanted Ground, and nothing but Scenes of  Magick lying round 
us.22
Reading each classical work is like passing through a natural scene. It is also, 
simultaneously, like creating landscapes of  the mind, for it is the Fancy that 
is being ‘entertained’, especially in a less regular work like the Iliad, to envi-
sion all kinds of  fantastic vistas. There seems to be no road to guide our 
steps through Homer’s ‘uninhabited’ country, while the ‘enchanted Ground’ 
of  Ovid might even be purposefully misleading, like a labyrinth. As Katherine 
Myers has shown, effects of  ‘enchantment’ in eighteenth-century gardening 
could be created through highly artifi cial means since, from the beholder’s 
20 The Spectator, ed. Donald F. Bond (Oxford, 1987, 5 vols), III, 552.
21 Stephanie Ross, What Gardens Mean (Chicago, 1998), 167.
22 The Spectator, III, 564.
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subjective experience, ‘illusion became a tool of  the designer’.23 Thus Horace 
Walpole wrote about the ‘simple enchantment’ of  the sunk fence, ‘which 
enabled Kent . . . to use “the pencil of  his imagination” (the visual idea) to 
bestow “all the arts of  landscape [painting] on the scenes he handled”’.24 In 
Addison’s passage, the art responsible for the creation of  such enhanced reali-
ties is called ‘Magick’, which puts the reader of  Ovid in a precarious position, 
as signalled by the quaint phrase ‘when we are in the Metamorphosis’. It seems 
to be precisely this kind of  experience that Coleridge attributes to the unsus-
pecting reader of  (Shakespearean) poetry: the ground is ‘enchanted’, that is, 
it only seems to be entirely natural. While in gardening Addison was strongly in 
favour of  such effects, in classical poetry he had other preferences: between 
the rudeness of  Homer and the subtle artfulness of  Ovid, the critic praises the 
human order of  Virgil’s epic as both safe and natural (in a familiar, cultivated 
way), expressly meant for the reader’s delight.
The complexity of  Addison’s position when he is thinking of  belles lettres 
in terms of  landscape is most clearly visible in Spectator No. 476, which is 
devoted to the question of  method. This is also the text in which rhetorical 
and scientifi c contexts enter into dialogue in what might be recognised today 
as early aesthetic theory:
When I read an Author of  Genius who writes without Method, I fancy 
my self  in a Wood that abounds with a great many noble Objects, rising 
among one another in the greatest Confusion and Disorder. When I 
read a methodical discourse, I am in a regular Plantation, and can place 
my self  in its several Centers, so as to take a View of  all the Lines and 
Walks that are struck from them. You may ramble in the one a whole 
Day together, and every Moment discover something or other that is 
new to you, but when you have done you will have but a confused 
imperfect Notion of  the Place; in the other, your Eye commands the 
whole Prospect, and gives you such an Idea of  it, as is not easily worn 
out of  the Memory.25 
23 Katherine Myers, ‘Ways of  Seeing: Joseph Addison, Enchantment and the Early 
Landscape Garden’, Garden History 41 (2013), 3–20, 15.
24 Horace Walpole, History of  the Modern Taste in Gardening, ed. John Dixon Hunt (1771; 
New York, 1995), 43–5. Quoted in Myers, ‘Ways of  Seeing’, 15.
25 The Spectator, IV, 186.
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Addison’s connection between immethodical discourse and genius calls to mind 
Shakespeare, the most irregular genius according to the criticism of  his time. 
Such a link may easily be assimilated to later romantic convictions, for instance 
William Blake’s proverb in The Marriage of  Heaven and Hell: ‘Improvement makes 
strait roads, but the crooked roads without Improvement are roads of  Genius’ 
(plate 10). ‘Improvement’, of  course, is a central eighteenth-century pursuit, 
whether in agriculture, urban planning, or in gardening.26 But if  Addison here 
seems to be drawn to the romantic-Blakean view, associating genius with 
irregularity, this too might be a trick of  perception, for apart from a few excep-
tional cases he deems the pursuit of  method a far more advisable strategy. His 
own writing, he admits, represents both kinds: there are some papers ‘written 
with Regularity and Method’, and others ‘that run out into the Wildness of  
those Compositions, which go by the Name of  Essays’.27 In the regular works, 
he has ‘the whole Scheme of  the Discourse in [his] Mind’ – exactly as recom-
mended by rhetoricians. This framework of  Addison’s thinking comes to the 
fore when he talks about method as a ‘great help to . . . Invention’ (i.e., rhetori-
cal inventio): the man who has a clear plan of  his discourse, ‘fi nds a great many 
thoughts rising out of  every Head’.28
On the whole, Ong fi nds that in the rhetorical writings of  Agricola, Ramus 
and their followers, oral-auditory models were losing ground to give way to 
an ‘inexorable disposition to represent thought and communication in terms 
of  spatial models and thus to reduce mental activity to local motion’.29 The 
association of  method with ‘way’ or ‘path’ proved particularly useful in this 
context. Melanchton, for instance, writes that method ‘opens a way through 
impenetrable and overgrown places (loca), through the confusion of  things, 
and pulls out and ranges in order the things (res) pertaining to the matter 
proposed’.30 Addison’s description of  the clear ‘Lines and Walks’ in methodi-
cal discourse, and his recurring conception of  reading as walking, are later 
manifestations of  the same tendency, although he shifts the focus, character-
istically, to the reader rather than the writer/orator. Clearly, Addison’s way of  
26 See e.g. Noah Heringman’s discussion of  ‘improvement’ in Thomas Whately’s 
Observations on Modern Gardening of  1770 and William Chambers’s Dissertation on 
Oriental Gardening of  1772 in his Romantic Rocks: Aesthetic Geology (Ithaca, NY, 2004), 
45–7. 
27 The Spectator, IV, 185.
28 Ibid., IV, 186.
29 Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of  Dialogue, 119.
30 Ibid., 158. Quoting Philip Melanchthon, Erotemata dialectices..., Lib. I, a fi ne, in 
Opera (1834–1860), XIII, col. 573.
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thinking is dependent on the same phenomenon that Ong believed to have 
informed the momentous change: the spread – or, in Addison’s case, the fl our-
ishing – of  print culture. It should be noted, however, that in his Spectator 
paper Addison also considers method in conversation (as Coleridge also will, 
in the Treatise on Method) complaining of  too many ‘Coffee-house Debates’ in 
which, ‘after the three fi rst Sentences’, the original question is entirely lost. It 
is signifi cant that Addison in a little narrative episode at the end of  the paper 
associates the immethodical speech of  ‘Tom Puzzle’ with free-thinking and 
religious scepticism, while his opponent ‘Mr Dry’ seems to be regular both in 
his thinking and in his morals.31 
As Peter Mack observes, when Addison became a model for polite writing 
in the course of  the later eighteenth century, it was not his ‘wilder’ composi-
tions (i.e., the essays, in the sense used in No. 476), but his regular treatises 
– especially on moral and religious subjects – that were recommended for 
study and imitation.32 In all probability, it was easier to assimilate this body 
of  work into the new courses on rhetoric and belles letters (e.g. those of  Hugh 
Blair, who offered minute analyses of  Addison’s style), as they shared distant 
ties to the same traditions. ‘Method’ fi rst rose to prominence in the context 
of  Renaissance education, offering a ‘shortcut’ to knowledge. Traces of  this 
educational aspect are still observable in Addison’s paper when he writes that 
methodical discourse is easier to follow and thus to retain in memory. Instead 
of  successive partial views, it offers a totalising visual idea in which ‘your Eye 
commands the whole Prospect’.    
4. The Forking Path of  Method
The Spectator No. 476 was translated into French and a substantial part of  
it was included in Diderot and D’Alembert’s Encyclopédie.33 The long entry 
on ‘Method’, of  which it became a part, illustrates a major transformation 
31 The Spectator , IV, 187–8.
32 Peter Mack, ‘Addison’s Essays as Models for Composition in School Anthologies and 
Textbooks of  the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries’, Paradigm 13 (1994), 42–54; 
idem, ‘Rhetoric and the Essay’, Rhetoric Society Quarterly 23 (1993), 41–9.
33 Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire Raisonné des Sciences, des Arts et des Métiers, eds. Denis Diderot 
and Jean le Roud d’Alembert (Paris, 1751–57; 17 vols), X, 460. Online edition by the 
University of  Chicago, ARTF Project: http://portail.atilf.fr/encyclopedie/; http://
portail.atilf.fr/cgi-bin/getobject_?a.75:155:4./var/artfl a/encyclopedie/textdata/
IMAGE, accessed 4 July 2017.
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described by Paul K. Alkon as follows: ‘From the essentially rhetorical 
conception of  method as the technique of  effectively organizing thought for 
communication – presentational method – there was a gradual shift to the 
more Cartesian conception of  method as a means of  inquiry.’34 This transfor-
mation had not been completed until the nineteenth century saw the ultimate 
disruption of  rhetorical modes of  thinking and the simultaneous emergence 
of  the sciences in the modern sense; thus, the editors of  the Encyclopédie 
(just as Coleridge in the Encyclopaedia Metropolitana) still presented method as, 
simultaneously, a rhetorical, logical, philosophical and scientifi c concept. The 
French version of  Addison’s text appeared in the section on the ‘arts and 
sciences’ written by Louis de Jaucourt, who even warned his readers not to 
put too much emphasis on method.35 But it is not at all diffi cult to see why 
Addison’s approach appealed to the encyclopaedists: its postulation of  central 
perspectives from which it is possible ‘to take a View of  all the Lines and 
Walks’ clearly resonates with the kinds of  argument made in other sections. 
Diderot, despite his general preference for Newton and experimental science, 
states that the Cartesian rules of  mathematical (or geometrical) method are 
equally valid in all the sciences.36 In a sub-section on grammar, he refers to 
method as ‘the means of  arriving at an end by the most convenient route’.37 A 
map-like view, such as the one available from one of  the ‘several Centers’ of  
Addison’s geometrical garden, would certainly prove useful in deciding which 
route would be the shortest and most convenient of  them all. 
In his Discourse on Method, Descartes repeatedly employed the metaphor of  
method as path or route, but often in a way that is messier than anything in 
Addison. Perhaps most memorably, he recounts in the third discourse his fi rm 
resolution ‘to follow no less constantly the most doubtful opinions, once I had 
34 Paul K. Alkon, ‘Critical and Logical Concepts of  Method from Addison to Coleridge’, 
Eighteenth Century Studies 5 (1971), 97–121, 99.
35 Cf. Ibid., 101–102. For Jaucourt’s text see Encyclopédie, X, 460. 
36 ‘La méthode dont nous venons de prescrire les regles, est la même que celle des Mathématiciens. On 
a semblé croire pendant longtems que leur méthode leur appartenoit tellement, qu’on ne pouvoit la 
transporter à aucune autre science. M. Wolff  a dissipé ce préjugé, & a fait voir dans la théorie, mais 
sur-tout dans la pratique, & dans la composition de tous ses ouvrages, que la méthode mathématique 
étoit celle de toutes les sciences, celle qui est naturelle à l’esprit humain, celle qui fait découvrir les 
vérités de tout genre.’ Ibid., X, 445.
37 ‘Une méthode est donc la maniere d’arriver à un but par la voie la plus convenable.’ Ibid., X, 
446. Cf. Simpson’s point that ‘the encyclopedic enterprise retains a clear affi liation 
with a Ramist-Cartesian tradition, a tradition arguably critical in the formation of  the 
encyclopedic ambition itself ’. David Simpson, Romanticism, Nationalism, and the Revolt 
against Theory (Chicago and London, 1993), 71. 
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determined on them, than I would if  they were very assured’. Adhering to this 
maxim, he imitates travellers ‘fi nding themselves astray in some forest’, who:
must not wander, turning now this way now that, and even less stop in 
one place, but must walk always as straight as they can in a given direc-
tion, and not change direction for weak reasons, even though it was 
perhaps only chance in the fi rst place which made them choose it; for, 
by this means, if  they do not go exactly where they wish to go they will 
arrive at least somewhere in the end where they will very likely will be 
better off  than in the middle of  a forest.38
According to this, the path of  method is not available (and especially, not 
measurable) in advance: it comes into being through the very activity of  the 
intellectual traveller. This is in fact surprisingly close to Coleridge’s under-
standing, who wishes to unite rhetorical and scientifi c concepts of  method 
and insists that what initiates the intellectual ‘progress’ is always an idea or at 
least an ‘intuition’ (his examples include those of  a circle and a triangle), and 
acknowledges how diffi cult it can be to adhere to it in actual practice:
It requires, in short, a constant wakefulness of  mind; so that if  we 
wander but in a single instance from our path, we cannot reach the goal, 
but by retracing our steps to the point of  divergency, and thus begin-
ning our progress anew. (TM, 4) 
Such discipline has to be learnt and practiced; Descartes recalls that he used to 
put aside some time ‘now and again’, ‘to exercise the method in the solution of  
mathematical diffi culties, or even in that of  some others which I could make 
almost like mathematical problems’.39
When eighteenth-century writers were describing the experience of  reading 
poetry, it was often in terms of  a leisurely stroll through ‘enchanted grounds’, 
without the pressing need to fi nd one’s way or to reach a destination. However, 
this was also the period when a new kind of  discourse was emerging, one that 
ventured to use a self-conscious theoretical framework and a more specialized 
terminology in order to account for the aesthetic experience, at times making 
works of  art appear ‘almost like mathematical problems’. For it was not only 




Coleridge who insisted on a secret affi nity between poetry and science: such 
a connection was already implicit in the works of  a number of  writers before 
him, most importantly, the Scottish associationist critics of  the second half  of  
the eighteenth century.40 Henry Home, Lord Kames, unapologetically states in 
the ‘Introduction’ to his Elements of  Criticism of  1762 that his principal aim was 
to turn criticism into a ‘rational science’.41 Just how strange such a proposition 
may have felt for his contemporaries can be guessed from a short conversation 
among members of  Samuel Johnson’s circle, as transcribed by James Boswell:
Johnson proceeded: ‘The Scotchman has taken the right method in his 
Elements of  Criticism. I do not mean that he had taught us anything: but 
he has told us old things in a new way.’ MURPHY. ‘He seems to have read 
a great deal of  French criticism, and wants to make it his own; as if  
he had been for years anatomising the heart of  man, and peeping into 
every cranny of  it.’ GOLDSMITH. ‘It is easier to write that book, than to 
read it.42
These casual remarks suggest that the discourse of  the Elements could be felt 
abstruse and foreign (in spite of  the fact that Kames vigorously defended 
Shakespeare against French neoclassicism), and that the relationship between 
abstract concept and empirical ‘fact’ was problematic. In fact, Kames’s venture 
involves a series of  startling manoeuvres regarding method: he is compelled 
to combine the concept of  method as articulated in connection with poetry 
(traditionally an area of  rhetoric) with the issue of  scientifi c method (‘anato-
mising the heart of  man’), and then fi nd the ‘presentational method’ (in Alkon’s 
term) most adequate to the communication of  his fi ndings (a matter closely 
linked to education). Kames stressed the experimental nature of  his project 
and that his results could only be tentative, nevertheless, his work was greatly 
infl uential in Britain and in America, as well as on the Continent (especially in 
40 On the emergence of  ‘criticism’ among the disciplines see Neil Rhodes, ‘From 
Rhetoric to Criticism’, in Robert Crawford (ed.), The Scottish Invention of  English 
Literature (Cambridge, 1998), 22–36. The question of  ‘mathematization’ is raised in 
Walter J. Ong, ‘Psyche and the Geometers: Associationist Critical Theory’ in idem, 
Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology: Studies in the Interaction of  Expression and Culture (1971; 
Ithaca and London, 1990), 213–36.
41 Henry Home, Lord Kames, Elements of  Criticism, ed. Peter Jones, gen. ed. Knud 
Haakonssen (Indianapolis, 2005; 6th edn; 2 vols), I, 14. 
42 James Boswell, The Life of  Samuel Johnson, LL.D. (Ware, 1999), 296.
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Germany).43 The success of  his disciplinary innovations is also indicated by 
the fact that his ‘Introduction’ to Elements of  Criticism was reprinted in the 1797 
Encyclopaedia Britannica article on ‘Criticism’.
‘Avoid a straight avenue directed upon a dwelling-house: better far an 
oblique approach in a waving line, with single trees and other scattered objects 
interposed’ – Kames advises in his chapter on the art of  gardening.44 The 
reason is that a ‘direct approach’ cannot command the attention for too long, 
while winding walks open new vistas ‘at every step’; they also convey a sense 
of  freedom and leisure: ‘my intention is not to make a journey, but to feast 
my eye on the beauties of  art and nature’.45 Ultimately it all boils down to 
the question of  whether one needs a ‘road’ or a ‘walk’, i.e., utility as opposed 
to aesthetic pleasure (and let us not forget that gardening, for Kames, was a 
‘useful art’ before it became ‘fi ne art’). For any useful purpose a straight road 
is invaluable, while in a ‘pleasure-ground’ walks ‘ought not to have any appear-
ance of  a road’.46 Of  course, a similar question may be raised in connection 
with Kames’s project of  establishing a new kind of  critical discourse. Is it 
meant for pleasure, or does it have some other purpose such as fi nding or 
communicating knowledge? In theory, the answer to this question should be 
inextricable from the method of  presentation, i.e. whether the author creates 
‘straight roads’ to convey knowledge, or ‘winding paths’ for entertainment. But 
in the Elements such differences are not as clear-cut as that. Johann Gottfried 
Herder, an early and careful reader of  Kames’s work, even compared it to a 
forest, very much in the sense as Johnson had used the image earlier, to refer 
to its rich but unsystematic nature.47
43 Norbert Bachleitner, ‘Die Rezeption von Henry Homes Elements of  Criticism 
in Deutschland 1763–1793’, Arcadia 20 (1985), 115–33. See also Neil Rhodes, 
‘Shakespeare in the Eighteenth Century’ in Robert DeMaria, Jr., Heesok Chang, and 
Samantha Zacher (eds.), A Companion to British Literature: Volume III: Long Eighteenth-
Century Literature 1660–1837 (Chichester, 2014), 35–48.
44 Lord Kames, Elements of  Criticism, II, 694.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 ‘Home presents a forest of  experiences, observations, and phenomena relating to the 
soul; but in keeping with his intention, it remains a forest. . . . His book has therefore 
no system; the fundamental concepts are not progressively elaborated; there is, 
strictly speaking, no order in its plan.’ Johann Gottfried Herder, Selected Writings on 
Aesthetics, trans. and ed. Gregory Moore (Princeton and Oxford, 2006), 276. The 
irony of  the fact that Herder’s own treatise belongs to his Critical Forests series (Fourth 
Grove, on Riedel’s Theory of  the Beaux Arts) is pointed out in Leroy R. Shaw, ‘Henry 
Home of  Kames: Precursor of  Herder’, Germanic Review 35 (1960), 16–27. 
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Kames in his ‘Introduction’ states that his aim was not ‘to compose a 
regular treatise’ but to impart his discoveries ‘in the gay and agreeable form 
of  criticism: imagining that this form will be more relished, and perhaps be 
no less instructive, than a regular and laboured disquisition’.48 Criticism is 
therefore essentially pleasurable; however, it is also instructive. The role of  
‘scattered objects’ arranged along a walking path is taken by illustrative exam-
ples, or what Kames calls ‘facts and experiments’, from which he plans ‘to 
ascend gradually to principles’.49 By this point, the method of  science and of  
pleasure seem to go hand in hand: according to Kames, the genuine scientifi c 
method also moves from ‘particular effects to general causes’, but it has its 
own aesthetic benefi ts as well, for ‘we feel a gradual dilation or expansion of  
mind, like what is felt in an ascending series, which is extremely pleasing: the 
pleasure here exceeds what arises from following the course of  nature’.50 The 
‘natural’ course, for followers of  Pierre Ramus, would have been to argue 
from general principles in order to demonstrate their particular consequences, 
i.e. the ‘synthetic method’, but Kames feels certain that the analytic is ‘more 
agreeable to the imagination’.51
Thanks to its pleasurable quality, the method of  criticism offers an entry 
into higher-level education. It ‘inures the refl ective mind to the most enticing 
sort of  logic’ because it creates a habit of  refl ection, which ‘prepares the mind 
for entering into subjects most intricate and abstract.’52 Disciplined thinking 
was thus the result of  practicing criticism. On these grounds, Kames proposes 
a new scheme of  instruction in which the study of  the fi ne arts would play 
the role of  ‘a middle link, connecting the different parts of  education into a 
regular chain’.53 In this, as in other respects, he is closely allied to his fellow 
thinkers of  the Scottish Enlightenment, most crucially Adam Smith, whose 
Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres were sponsored by Kames and attended by 
many infl uential contemporaries. John Millar in a letter to Dugald Stewart gave 
the following account of  Smith’s scheme in his lectures:
The best method of  explaining and illustrating the various powers of  
the human mind, the most useful part of  metaphysics, arises from an 
examination of  the several ways of  communicating our thoughts by 
48 Lord Kames, Elements of  Criticism, I, 18.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid., I, 25.
51 Ibid., I, 26.
52 Ibid., I, 15.
53 Ibid.
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speech, and from an attention to the principles of  those literary com-
positions which contribute to persuasion or entertainment. By these 
arts, every thing that we perceive or feel, every operation of  our minds, 
is expressed and delineated in such a manner, that it may be clearly dis-
tinguished and remembered. There is, at the same time, no branch of  
literature more suited to youth at their fi rst entrance upon philosophy 
than this, which lays hold of  their taste and their feelings.54 
Such considerations about method – in both the educational-rhetorical and 
the scientifi c sense – clearly informed the emerging discourse of  British scien-
tifi c or ‘philosophical’ criticism. William Richardson, the author of  a series of  
critical analyses of  Shakespeare’s characters (and a student of  Smith’s) stresses 
the educational benefi ts of  the study of  poetry in a similar vein, stating that it 
conducts us ‘to the temple of  truth, by an easier and more agreeable path than 
that of  mere metaphysics’.55 The scope of  George Campbell’s The Philosophy 
of  Rhetoric is different (although rhetoric, for him, still includes poetry), but the 
justifi cation of  his project is similar: 
Besides, this study, properly conducted, leads directly to an acquaint-
ance with ourselves; it not only traces the operations of  the intellect and 
imagination, but discloses the lurking springs of  action in the heart. In 
this view it is perhaps the surest and the shortest, as well as the pleas-
antest way of  arriving at the science of  the human mind.56
The newly scientifi c study of  rhetoric (Campbell also calls it ‘criticism’), is 
not only the most pleasant, but also the most effi cient and reliable way to 
the understanding of  the mind. Given the diffi culties involved in observing 
the minutiae of  mental activity, it might even be argued that it is the only way 
Campbell can think of. 
54 Adam Smith, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, ed. J. C. Bryce (Indianapolis, 1985), 
11.
55 William Richardson, A Philosophical Analysis and Illustration of  Some of  Shakespeare’s 
Remarkable Characters (Edinburgh, 1774), 26.
56 George Campbell, The Philosophy of  Rhetoric (London and Edinburgh, 1776, 2 vols), 
I, 16.
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5. Coleridge and Kames
There is a notable tension in all these passages between the emphasis on pleas-
ure (which might be still instructive) and the writers’ ambition to conduct a 
rigorously scientifi c investigation (which might be rather less delightful for a 
general readership). As we have seen in Kames, the shortest road is hardly the 
most pleasurable one. The emerging discipline of  ‘criticism’ – which overlaps 
with what might be called early British aesthetics – was carefully balanced 
between its two modes of  communication, and often found itself  stuck 
between them.57 This can be observed in the very fi rst chapter of  Elements of  
Criticism, in which Kames feels obliged to apologize to his readers for having to 
explain some abstract principles in advance, and – foreshadowing Coleridge’s 
move in the Biographia Literaria – he asks those with ‘an invincible aversion to 
abstract speculation’ to ‘stop short here’.58 The problem is not only that of  
‘disposition’ – i.e., of  arranging his arguments in the best possible order. It is a 
problem concerning scientifi c method. For, as the above excerpts clearly show, 
the new philosophical criticism was not content with critiquing the effects of  
rhetoric or poetry by referring to the established principles of  mental activ-
ity. It also wanted to discover them fi rst. It is true that a fundamental approach 
was already provided by associationism on which all of  these authors relied; 
however, they make clear that there are still large areas of  the mind unexplored 
by philosophy, to which poetry (or rhetoric) might provide the only entry. In 
his ‘Introduction’ Kames notes that the analysis of  how poetry works might 
be instrumental to the understanding of  mental operations in general. His 
primary aim was criticism, he concedes, but ‘he will not disown, that all along 
it has been his view, to explain the nature of  man, considered as a sensitive 
being capable of  pleasure and pain’.59 This ambitious scientifi c ‘view’ is care-
fully couched in the rhetoric of  pleasure, but it is nevertheless an extension of  
the Humean ‘Science of  Man’: a remarkable project that rediscovers art as a 
tool to uncover the workings of  the mind. 
57 Cf. Robin Valenza’s analysis: ‘Attempting to imitate physics’ extraordinary success, 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century moral philosophers aimed to “introduce the 
experimental method of  reasoning into moral subjects.” However, unlike the 
physicists, moral philosophers fostered the belief  that a popular and a scholarly 
work could be coextensive, that a single book could advance a discipline and still be 
readable by a broad audience.’ Robin Valenza, Literature, Language, and the Rise of  the 
Intellectual Disciplines in Britain, 1680–1820 (Cambridge, 2009), 35.
58 Lord Kames, Elements of  Criticism, I, 27.
59 Ibid., I, 14.
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It is in this context that Shakespeare’s oeuvre again comes to the fore, and 
not only as the object of  critical scrutiny, but also as something that makes 
such scrutiny possible. Kames and, following him, several other critics, attempt 
to trace the laws of  the mind from the ‘experiments’ of  Shakespeare’s plays. 
In order to certify, for instance, how the different passions modify thinking, 
Kames studies the language of  Othello and Hamlet, and based on the insights 
he gleans from them, he proceeds to judge how far other writers manage to 
‘follow nature’ in various selected passages. Nature is thereby not so much 
‘methodized’ as Shakespeareanized. Thus, when Coleridge in his Treatise cites 
the speech of  Hamlet and of  Dame Quickly from Henry IV, Part 2, in order 
to show how Shakespeare ‘exemplif[ies] the opposite faults of  Method in two 
different characters’ (TM, 23), he is squarely working in the Kamesian tradi-
tion, even if  he makes a pointed reference to Schlegel, ‘a foreign critic of  great 
and deserved reputation’ who had discovered that Shakespeare ‘gives us the 
history of  minds; he lays open to us, in a single word, a whole series of  preceding condi-
tions’ (TM, 20, emphasis in the original). In fact, this was very much the kind of  
thing that Kames was also after, although he considers the ‘single word’ always 
in its associative relation to others (however, the expression ‘whole series of  
preceding conditions’ might point in the same direction). In any case, it is 
hardly a coincidence that the very same passage by Dame Quickly is analysed 
in the fi rst chapter of  Elements of  Criticism to illustrate the association of  ideas, 
right before Kames’s discussion of  method. 
Editors of  Coleridge had assumed that he came across this example in 
a German book, J. J. Engel’s Anfangsgründe einer Theorie der Dichtungsarten.60 
However, a glance at this work confi rms that Engel himself  is deeply indebted 
to Kames: he not only relies on the concept of  ‘Ideenreihe’ (no doubt, Kames’s 
‘trains of  ideas’), but also introduces a distinction between dramatic ‘represen-
tation’ (Darstellung) and undramatic ‘report’ (Berichtung), which is a re-working 
of  Kames’s pair of  ‘expression’ (‘expressing a passion as one does who feels it’) 
and ‘description’ (‘describing it in the language of  a spectator’).61 Signifi cantly, 
Engel had already published, with his friend Christian Garve, a revised transla-
tion of  the Elements in 1772.62 Thus, whether Coleridge had found the example 
of  Mistress Quickly in Engel’s work, or in Kames (which I think more likely, 
60 See Coleridge, The Friend, I, 370n; II, 451n.
61 Johann Jakob Engel, Über Handlung, Gespräch und Erzählung (Stuttgart, 1964). Kames, 
Elements of  Criticism, I, 312.
62 Heiner F. Klemme and Manfred Kuehn (eds.), The Bloomsbury Dictionary of  Eighteenth-
Century German Philosophers (London etc., 2016), 184.
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based on its proximity to his discussion of  method), or even in Alexander 
Gerard (who also cites it in his Essay on Genius), the framework is still provided 
by Scottish associationism. At this point we might conclude that Coleridge’s 
indebtedness to Kames and generally to the Scottish  Enlightenment is ripe 
for  further investigation. What seems to be clear, though, is that from the 
eighteenth to the early nineteenth century Shakespeare’s works provided the 
‘ground’ where various concepts of  method could be explored – paths of  
rhetorical analysis, educational schemes, or of  scientifi c discovery, that some-
times met but more often diverged – all playing a crucial role in the emergence 
of  the new discipline of  ‘criticism’. Conceptual metaphors of  gardens, forests, 
or enchanted landscapes offered a way of  working out such interconnections, 
suggesting points of  affi nity, but also of  resistance, between how literature 
and gardening could be conceived.    
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